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Abstract
We propose a framework for the veriﬁcation of multi-agent systems’ speciﬁcation by symbolic
model checking. The language CTLKD (an extension of CTL) allows for the representation of the
temporal evolution of epistemic states of the agents, as well as their correct and incorrect functioning
behaviour. We ground our analysis on the semantics of deontic interpreted systems. The veriﬁcation
approach is based on an adaption of the technique of bounded model checking, a mainstream
approach in veriﬁcation of reactive systems. We test our results on a typical communication
scenario: the bit transmission problem with faults.
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1 Introduction
The task of software engineers is to design and deploy a computer system
that meets a particular set of speciﬁcations. This is by no means a trivial
task. Only in the past few months the problems with nasa’s and esa’s Mars
exploration missions have made news showing how many unforeseen problems
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even a thoroughly-designed distributed system may encounter. In mission-
critical software as well as in particularly sensitive applications such as Internet
protocols, the worldwide electronic banking system, etc., software engineers
are interested in analysing the properties of software, and in particular in
checking whether particular conditions, from the basic ones of deadlock to
more complex ones, hold for a particular system.
The area of multi-agent systems is also interested in a similar set of prob-
lems. Multi-agent systems [17] are distributed systems in which the individual
processes, or agents, are autonomous entities that engage in social activities
such as coordination, negotiation, cooperation, etc. Since multi-agent systems
are autonomous and social, their range of possible behaviours is even greater
than the one of traditional distributed systems. It follows from this that the
issue of veriﬁcation of the properties a system satisﬁes is just as important in
multi-agent systems.
Software validation, i.e., the process of checking that a piece of software
satisﬁes certain characteristics, is currently conducted by means of three main
techniques: testing, theorem proving, and model checking. Testing involves
searching the state-space of the possible inputs of a program looking for po-
tentially problematic outputs. Theorem proving techniques are based on the
representation of a program by means of a system of formal logic; in its sim-
plest instance, checking whether a property is satisﬁed amounts to checking
whether a formula is a theorem of the logic that represents the program. Model
checking in its mainstream approach involves representing all possible com-
putational traces of a program by means of a temporal model (appropriately
represented) and checking whether or not a temporal formula, representing
the property to be veriﬁed, holds in this model.
Software validation has in other words an intrinsic “deontic connotation”.
It amounts to checking whether the system under consideration behaves as it is
prescribed by its speciﬁcation. But it should be noted that, in this approach,
this is a property that is external from the logical system. One could say,
the correct functioning behaviour of the system is a metalogical property of
the logic system representing the program. Diﬀerently from what happens
in deontic logic, deontic concepts here are not explicitly used in the logic to
represent the system, but they are built into the procedures that operate on
the logic used to check the system.
Although a range of systems have been veriﬁed by means of standard
veriﬁcation techniques, multi-agent systems applications call for a reﬁned ap-
proach. Consider for example a number of automatic agents bidding for goods
on an electronic auction. There may be rules as to how these agents may con-
duct their bidding, but it is often unfeasible and/or counterproductive to have
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many of these rules hard-wired in the auction protocol itself. As designers of
the auction we may consider it beneﬁcial that agents do not bid several times
a second on the same good not to have resulting denial-of-service problems
at server-level, but it seems diﬃcult to enforce this when the agents are pro-
grammed by a variety of software houses on which we have no control. Other
examples from traditional federated databases to more recent fault-control
modules in mission-critical software point to similar conclusions: it is impor-
tant to reason about the properties that hold in a system when the programs
are functioning following their speciﬁcation but also (and occasionally even
more importantly) even they do not. In other words, not only we would like
to check whether a system satisﬁes its speciﬁcation, but also we would like to
derive the consequences resulting from the system not behaving as intended.
Diﬀerent deontic logics have been used to bring to the logical object level the
distinction between correct (or ideal, normative, etc.) and incorrect states.
In this paper we would like to take these ideas one step further and provide
a technique by means of which we can not not specify but also automatically
verify properties expressing compliance of a multi-agent system with respect
to speciﬁcations.
To carry out this analysis we use the formal machinery of veriﬁcation by
model checking [4], and in particular the one of Bounded Model Checking via
SAT translation [3]. In veriﬁcation by model checking one typically describes a
system S by means of a program in a language such as smv [12]. This descrip-
tion is then supplied to the model checker which produces the (appropriately
encoded) temporal model MS representing all the possible executions of sys-
tem S. To check whether a property P is satisﬁed in S one checks whether the
temporal model MS satisﬁes a formula φP representing P , i.e., MS |= φP . The
key problem in this approach is to manage the representation of the resulting
model MS. One of the techniques available to keep the approach feasible is
bounded model checking. This technique focuses on the attempt to discover
faults in the speciﬁcation of the system. Rather than checking the whole state
space for the veriﬁcation of the property, in bounded model checking one
checks whether the negation of the property is actually satisﬁed on a fraction
of the model, thereby producing a counterexample. Furthermore, the actual
check is translated into a standard propositional satisﬁability problem by com-
puting appropriate translations into propositional formulas representing both
the truncated model, and the formula to be checked. By means of this ap-
proach subtle bugs in protocols for reactive systems have been discovered. We
refer to [1,3,5,14] for more details.
While in reactive systems it is enough to model a system by means of a
purely temporal language, multi-agent systems are deﬁned following what is
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often referred to as the “intentional stance” [6]. In other words it is useful to
describe autonomous agents in terms of their knowledge, belief, intentions, so-
cial context, etc. This implies that the model checking problem for multi-agent
systems cannot simply be stated as one on temporal logic but that richer for-
malisms need being used. In past research we have provided a model checking
algorithm for a branching time temporal-epistemic logic (CTLK) [13]. In this
paper we extend this work by providing a bounded model checking algorithm
for a logic that comprises knowledge and a deontic component representing
correct functioning behaviour of the system.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we ﬁx the notation on the
semantics of deontic interpreted systems. In Section 3 we present the language
of CTLKD, an extension of CTLK, representing correct/incorrect function-
ing behaviour of the agents. In Section 4 we present a bounded semantics
deﬁnition for satisfaction that we use in Section 5 to deﬁne the algorithm of
bounded model checking. In Section 6 we apply the formalism to an example
close to the multi-agent systems literature: the bit transmission problem with
faults.
2 Deontic Interpreted Systems
In this section we introduce deontic interpreted systems. These were deﬁned
in [10] to represent and reason about correct functioning behaviour of multi-
agent systems. They provide a semantics based on the computation states of
the agents, on which it is possible to interpret a modality Oiφ, representing
the fact “in all correct functioning executions of agent i, φ holds”, as well as
a traditional epistemic modality Kiφ representing knowledge of φ by agent
i, and standard branching time temporal operators 5 . An axiomatisation of
deontic interpreted systems has been provided for the non-temporal fragment
of the language; we refer the interested reader to [11] for more details.
The following is reported to ﬁx the notation only; more details can be found
in [10,13]. Let PV be a set of propositional variables and A = {1, . . . , n} be
a set of agents. Consider n non-empty sets L1, . . . , Ln of local states, one for
each agent of the system, and a set Le of local states for the environment.
For each agent i ∈ A, consider a set of possible actions Acti, and n protocols
Pi : Li → 2
Acti representing the functioning behaviour of every agent, and
Pe : Le → 2
Acte for the environment.
Further assume that for every agent, its set of local states can be parti-
tioned into allowed and disallowed states. We call these states green and red
respectively. For n agents and n + 1 mutually disjoint and non-empty sets
5 Temporal operators were not actually used in [10] but this is a straightforward extension.
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G1, . . . ,Gn,Ge we deﬁne the set S of all possible global states as the Cartesian
product L1 × . . . × Ln × Le, such that L1 ⊇ G1, . . . , Ln ⊇ Gn, Le ⊇ Ge. Ge is
called the set of green states for the environment, and for any agent i, Gi is
called the set of green states for agent i. The complement of Ge with respect
to Le (denoted by Re) is called the set of red states for the environment, and
similarly the complement Gi with respect to Li (denoted by Ri) is called the
set of red states for the agent i.
We can model the computation taking place in the system by means of a
transition function t : S × Act → S, where Act ⊆ Act1 × . . . × Actn × Acte
is the set of joint actions. Intuitively, given an initial state ι ∈ S, the sets
of protocols, and the transition function, we can build a (possibly inﬁnite)
structure that represents all the possible computations of the system. Indeed,
we will deal with systems, in which the state space consists of reachable global
states only. A state s ∈ S is reachable if there is a sequence of states (s0, . . . , sn)
such that s0, . . . , sn ∈ S, s0 = ι, sn = s, and for all i ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1} there
exists an action acti ∈ Act such that t(si, acti) = si+1, i.e., si+1 is the result
of applying the transition function t to the global state si, and a joint action
acti. If each of the components of acti is prescribed by the corresponding
protocol Pj at agent j’s local state at si, then the resulting state will only
contain green local states, otherwise it may contain some red local states. For
further considerations on this see [10]. In the following we abstract from the
transition function, the actions, and the protocols, and simply use the relation
T , but it should be clear that this is uniquely determined by the interpreted
system under consideration.
Let li : S → Li be a function which returns the local state of agent i from
a global state. A deontic interperted system is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 2.1 [Deontic Interperted System]
Given a set of agents A = {1, . . . , n}, a set of global states S, protocols, and a
transition function, a deontic interperted system (or simply a model) is a tuple
M = (DS, ι, T, RO1 , . . . , R
O
n , R
K
1 , . . . , R
K
n ,V) where
• DS ⊆ S is a ﬁnite set of reachable global states for A,
• ι ∈ DS is an initial state,
• T ⊆ DS × DS is a serial 6 binary relation on DS,
• ROi ⊆ DS × DS is a relation for each agent i ∈ A deﬁned by: sR
O
i s
′ iﬀ
li(s
′) ∈ Gi
7 ,
6 A relation R ⊆ X ×X is serial if for all x ∈ X there exists y ∈ X such that xRy.
7 Since each RO
i
only depends on the target state, for what pertains this component we
could have equally deﬁned a model by means of green local states for agent i.
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• RKi ⊆ DS × DS is a relation for each agent i ∈ A deﬁned by: sR
K
i s
′ iﬀ
li(s
′) = li(s),
• V : DS −→ 2PV is a valuation function such that true ∈ V(s) for all s ∈ DS.
V assigns to each state a set of proposition variables that are assumed to
be true at that state.
By |M | we denote the number of states of M , whereas N = {0, 1, 2, . . .}
indicates the set of natural numbers, and N+ = {1, 2, . . .} the set of positive
natural numbers.
A computation in M is an inﬁnite sequence π = (s0, s1, . . .) of states such
that (si, si+1) ∈ T for each i ∈ N. For a computation π = (s0, s1, . . .), let
π(k) = sk, and πk = (s0, . . . , sk), for each k ∈ N. In the rest of the paper we
shall call πk a k-computation. Moreover, a k−computation πk is a (k,l)-loop if
(πk(k), πk(l)) ∈ T for some 0 ≤ l ≤ k. We call πk simply a loop if there is an
l ∈ N with l ≤ k for which πk is a (k,l)-loop. By Π(s) we denote the set of all
the inﬁnite computations starting at state s, whereas by Πk(s) the set of all
the k−computations starting at s.
3 The logic CTLKD
Here we ﬁx syntax and semantics for CTLKD, an extension of CTL [7], in-
troduced by Emerson and Clarke, enriched with modal operators representing
correct functioning behaviour [11], and standard epistemic operators [8]. The
bounded model checking problem of the temporal epistemic fragment of the
language was analysed in [13].
Deﬁnition 3.1 [Syntax of CTLKD]
Let PV be a set of propositional variables also containing the symbol true.
The set of CTLKD formulas FORM is deﬁned inductively as follows:
• every member p of PV is a formula,
• if α and β are formulas, then so are ¬α, α ∧ β and α ∨ β,
• if α is formula, then so are EXα, EGα and EU(α, β),
• if α is formula, then so are Oiα, and Kiα, for i ∈ A.
Intuitively, E means there exists a computation, Xα is true in a computa-
tion if α is true at the second state of the computation, U(α, β) is true in a
computation if β is true at some state on the computation and always earlier
α holds, and Gα is true in a computation if α is true at all the states of the
computation. We use the indexed modal operatorOi to represent the correctly
functioning circumstances of agent i. The formula Oiα stands for “there is
a state where agent i is functioning correctly, and in which α holds”. We
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refer to [10,11] for a discussion of this notion 8 . Moreover we use the indexed
modality Ki to represent the diamond of an epistemic operator for agent i [8]:
Kiα stands for “agent i considers possible that α”.
The derived basic modalities are deﬁned as follows: EFα
def
= EU(true, α),
AXα
def
= ¬EX¬α, AFα
def
= ¬EG¬α, AR(α, β)
def
= ¬EU(¬α,¬β), AGα
def
=
¬EF¬α, Oiα
def
= ¬Oi¬α for i ∈ A, Kiα
def
= ¬Ki¬α for i ∈ A. Moreover,
α → β
def
= ¬α ∨ β.
The logic ECTLKD is the restriction of CTLKD such that the negation can
be applied only to elements of PV , i.e., ¬α is replaced by ¬p in Deﬁnition 3.1.
The logic ACTLKD is the restriction of CTLKD such that its language is
deﬁned as {¬ϕ | ϕ ∈ ECTLKD}. It is easy to see that ACTLKD consists of
the temporal formulas of the form: AXα, AR(α, β), AFα, Kiα and Oiα.
Deﬁnition 3.2 [Semantics of CTLKD]
Let M be a model, s be a state, and α, β be formulas of CTLKD. M, s |= α
denotes that α is true at the state s in the model M . M is omitted, if it is
implicitly understood. The relation |= is deﬁned inductively as follows:
s |= p iﬀ p ∈ V(s),
s |= ¬α iﬀ s |= α,
s |= α ∨ β iﬀ s |= α or s |= β,
s |= α ∧ β iﬀ s |= α and s |= β,
s |= EXα iﬀ (∃π ∈ Π(s)) π(1) |= α,
s |= EGα iﬀ (∃π ∈ Π(s))(∀m ≥ 0) π(m) |= α,
s |= EU(α, β) iﬀ (∃π ∈ Π(s))(∃m ≥ 0) [π(m) |= β and (∀j < m) π(j) |= α],
s |= Oiα iﬀ ∃s
′ ∈ DS (sROi s
′ and s′ |= α),
s |= Kiα iﬀ ∃s
′ ∈ DS (sRKi s
′ and s′ |= α).
Deﬁnition 3.3 [Validity] A CTLKD formula ϕ is valid in a model
M = (DS, ι, T, RO1 , . . . , R
O
n , R
K
1 , . . . , R
K
n ,V) (denoted M |= ϕ) iﬀ M, ι |= ϕ,
i.e., ϕ is true at the initial state of the model M .
8 Note that the operator Oi is there referred to as Pi.
B. Woz´na et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 126 (2005) 93–114 99
4 Bounded Semantics for ECTLKD
In this section we give a bounded semantics for ECTLKD in order to deﬁne
the bounded model checking problem for ECTLKD, and to translate it subse-
quently into a satisﬁability problem. This formalism is an extension of the
one presented in [14].
Deﬁnition 4.1 [k−model]
Let M = (DS, ι, T, RO1 , . . . , R
O
n , R
K
1 , . . . , R
K
n ,V) be a model and k ∈ N+. A tu-
ple Mk = (DS, ι, Pk, R
O
1 , . . . , R
O
n , R
K
1 , . . . , R
K
n ,V) is a k−model for M , where
Pk is the set of all the k-computations of M , i.e., Pk =
⋃
s∈DS Πk(s).
Satisfaction for the temporal operators in the bounded case depends on
whether or not the computation π deﬁnes a loop, i.e., whether loop(π) = ∅,
where loop is deﬁned below.
Deﬁnition 4.2 [loop]
Let M = (DS, ι, T, RO1 , . . . , R
O
n , R
K
1 , . . . , R
K
n ,V) be a model, k ∈ N+ be a bound,
Pk =
⋃
s∈DS Πk(s), and π ∈ Pk. The function loop : Pk → 2
{0,...,k} is deﬁned
as follows:
loop(π) = {l | 0 ≤ l ≤ k and (π(k), π(l)) ∈ T}
Note that the interpretation of the temporal modalities on bounded se-
mantics is diﬀerent from the one of Deﬁnition 3.2.
Deﬁnition 4.3 [Bounded semantics]
Let Mk be a k−model and α, β be ECTLKD formulas. Mk, s |= α denotes
that α is true at the state s of Mk. Mk is omitted if it is clear from the
context. The relation |= is deﬁned inductively as follows:
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s |= p iﬀ p ∈ V(s), for p ∈ PV ,
s |= ¬p iﬀ p ∈ V(s), for p ∈ PV ,
s |= α ∨ β iﬀ s |= α or s |= β,
s |= α ∧ β iﬀ s |= α and s |= β,
s |= EXα iﬀ (∃π ∈ Πk(s)) π(1) |= α,
s |= EGα iﬀ (∃π ∈ Πk(s))(∀0 ≤ j ≤ k)(π(j) |= α and loop(π) = ∅),
s |= EU(α, β) iﬀ (∃π ∈ Πk(s))(∃0 ≤ j ≤ k)(π(j) |= β and
(∀0 ≤ i < j)π(i) |= α),
s |= Oiα iﬀ (∃π ∈ Πk(ι))(∃0 ≤ j ≤ k)(π(j) |= α and sR
O
i π(j)),
s |= Kiα iﬀ (∃π ∈ Πk(ι))(∃0 ≤ j ≤ k)(π(j) |= α and sR
K
i π(j)).
The above extends to deontic modalities the bounded semantics of [13,14].
As in [13] we note that the given Deﬁnition 2.1, the relations for the operator
Oi used above are constructed on the basis of the internal structure of the
global states of the system (i.e., they are deﬁned on the basis of the local
states of the agents), and not by means of an ad-hoc construction by the
modeller of the system. Note also that while the conditions for the temporal
components require the states to be reachable from the state in consideration,
this is not the case for operators Oi and Ki, where we consider whether or
not there is a computation from the initial state that results in a state that is
related for agent i from the global state under consideration. This guarantees
reachability of such a state and corresponds to the usual interpretation of the
modalities in the non-bounded model.
The theoretical results proved in [13] for CTLK can easily be extended for
CTLKD.
Deﬁnition 4.4 [Validity for Bounded Semantics] An ECTLKD formula ϕ is
valid in a k-model Mk (denoted M |=k ϕ) iﬀ Mk, ι |= ϕ.
Next, we describe how the model checking problem (M |= ϕ) can be re-
duced to the bounded model checking problem (M |=k ϕ).
Lemma 4.5 Let M be a model, s be a state of M , and ϕ be an ECTLKD
formula. Then, the following two conditions hold:
a) Mk, s |= ϕ implies Ml, s |= ϕ, for l ≥ k,
b) Mk, s |= ϕ implies M, s |= ϕ.
Proof. Straightforward by induction on the length of ϕ. 
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Lemma 4.6 Let M be a model, ϕ be an ECTLKD formula, s be a state of
M , and k = |M |. If M, s |= ϕ, then Mk, s |= ϕ.
Proof. By induction on the length of ϕ. The lemma follows directly for the
propositional variables and their negations.
Next, assume that the hypothesis holds for all the proper sub-formulas of
ϕ. If ϕ is equal to either α ∧ β or α ∨ β, then it is easy to check that the
lemma holds. Consider ϕ to be of the following forms:
• ϕ = EXα | EGα | EU(α, β). By induction hypothesis — see [14] page
139.
• ϕ = Oiα. By deﬁnition, there is a state s
′ in M such that li(s
′) ∈ Gi
and M, s′ |= α. By the inductive assumption, we have that Mk, s
′ |= α.
Since s′ is reachable, it is reachable from ι in at most k steps as k = |M |.
Thus, there is a k−computation π ∈ Pk such that π(0) = ι and π(i) = s
′
for some i ≤ k. So, we have Mk, s |= Oiα.
• ϕ = Kiα. By deﬁnition, there is a state s
′ in M such that li(s) = li(s
′)
and M, s′ |= α. By the inductive assumption, we have that Mk, s
′ |= α.
Since s′ is reachable, it is reachable from ι in at most k steps as k = |M |.
Thus, there is a k−computation π ∈ Pk such that π(0) = ι and π(i) = s
′
for some i ≤ k. So, we have Mk, s |= Kiα.

In this setting we can prove that in some circumstances satisﬁability in the
|M |-bounded semantics is equivalent to the unbounded one.
Theorem 4.7 Let M = (DS, ι, T, RO1 , . . . , R
O
n , R
K
1 , . . . , R
K
n ,V) be a model, ϕ
be an ECTLKD formula and k = |M |. Then, M |= ϕ iﬀ M |=k ϕ.
Proof. Straightforward from Lemma 4.5 and Lemma 4.6 above. 
Given that we reasoned on a bounded model of size |M | there is nothing
surprising about the results above. The rationale behind the method is that
for particular examples checking satisﬁability of a formula can be done on a
small fragment of the model.
5 The BMC algorithm for ECTLKD
In this section we present a Bounded Model Checking (BMC) method for
ECTLKD. This is an extension of the method appearing in [13,14]. This
construction ﬁrst appeared in [14], and was then extended in [13] for the
CTLK case.
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Deﬁnition 5.1 Let Mk = (DS, ι, Pk, R
O
1 , . . . , R
O
n , R
K
1 , . . . , R
K
n ,V) be a k-model
of M . We say that a structure M ′k = (DS
′, ι, Pk
′, R′O1 , . . . , R
′O
n , R
′K
1 , . . . , R
′K
n ,V
′)
is a submodel of Mk if Pk
′ ⊆ Pk, States(Pk
′) ⊆ DS ′ ⊆ DS, R′Oi = R
O
i ∩ (DS
′×
DS ′), for i ∈ A, R′Ki = R
K
i ∩ (DS
′ × DS ′), for i ∈ A, and V ′ = V|DS′ , where
States(Pk
′) deﬁnes the set of states reached in all computations in Pk
′, and
V|DS′ denotes the restriction of the interpretation function V to DS
′, a subset
of DS (upon which V is deﬁned).
For technical reasons we allow for having states in DS ′, which may not
be reached in Pk
′, but obviously all the states of DS ′ are reachable in Mk
as DS ′ ⊆ DS. The bounded semantics of ECTLKD over submodels M ′k can
still be deﬁned as for Mk (see Def. 4.3). Our present aim is give a bound
for the number of k-computations in M ′k such that the validity of ϕ in Mk is
equivalent to the validity of ϕ in M ′k.
Deﬁnition 5.2 Deﬁne a function fk : FORM→ N as follows:
• fk(p) = fk(¬p) = 0, where p ∈ PV ,
• fk(α ∨ β) = max{fk(α), fk(β)},
• fk(α ∧ β) = fk(α) + fk(β),
• fk(EGα) = (k + 1) · fk(α) + 1,
• fk(EU(α, β)) = k · fk(α) + fk(β) + 1,
• fk(Y α) = fk(α) + 1, for Y ∈ {EX,Ki,Oi}.
The function fk determines the number of k-computations of a submodel
M ′k suﬃcient for checking an ECTLKD formula. Here we take this bound as
given, but we provide a proof of the adequacy of this in the next section.
The main idea of the BMC method is that we can check ϕ over Mk by
checking the satisﬁability of a propositional formula [M,ϕ]k = [M
ϕ,ι]k∧ [ϕ]Mk ,
where the ﬁrst conjunct represents (part of) the model under consideration,
and the second a number of constraints that must be satisﬁed on Mk for ϕ
to be satisﬁed. Once this translation is deﬁned, checking satisﬁability of an
ECTLKD formula can be done by means of a SAT-checker. Although from
a theoretical point of view the complexity of this operation is no easier, in
practice the eﬃciency of modern SAT-checkers makes the process worthwhile
in many instances. In this process, an important decision to take is the size
k of the truncation; there are heuristics that can be developed for particular
classes of examples [2]. A trivial mechanism, for instance, would be to start
with k := 1, test satisﬁability for the translation, and increase k by one either
until [Mϕ,ι]k ∧ [ϕ]Mk becomes satisﬁable or k reaches |M |.
Deﬁnition 5.3 BMC algorithm for ECTLKD:
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(1) Let ϕ := ¬ψ (where ψ is an ACTLKD formula).
(2) Set k := 1.
(3) Select the k−model Mk.
(4) Select the submodels M ′k of Mk with |Pk
′| ≤ fk(ϕ).
(5) Translate the transition relation of all the submodels M ′k of Mk into a
propositional formula [Mϕ,ι]k.
(6) Translate ϕ over all M ′k into a propositional formula [ϕ]Mk .
(7) Check the satisﬁability of [M,ϕ]k := [M
ϕ,ι]k ∧ [ϕ]Mk .
(8) If [M,ϕ]k is satisﬁable, then return M |= ϕ (i.e., M |= ψ ), else set
k := k + 1.
(9) If k = |M | + 1, then return M |= ϕ (i.e., M |= ψ) else go to 3.
Now, we give details of this translation. We begin with an encoding of
the transitions in the interpreted system under consideration. Recall that
the set of reachable global states is DS ⊆
∏n
i=1 Li × Le, where Li ⊇ Gi
for each agent i ∈ A, and Le ⊇ Ge for the environment. We assume that
Li = Gi∪Ri ⊆ {0, 1}
gi×{0, 1}ri, where gi = log2(|Gi|), ri = log2(|Ri|), and
Le = Ge ∪Re ⊆ {0, 1}
ge × {0, 1}re, where ge = log2(|Ge|), re = log2(|Re|).
Let g1 + r1 + . . . + gn + rn + ge + re = m. Then, each global state s =
(l1, . . . , ln, le) = (s[1], . . . , s[m]) can be represented by w = (w[1], . . . , w[m])
(which we shall call a global state variable), where each w[i] for i = 1, . . . , m
is a propositional variable. Notice that we distinguish between global states
being sequences of binary digits and their representations in terms of propo-
sitional variables w[i]. A ﬁnite sequence (w0, . . . , wk) of global state variables
is called a symbolic k−path. In general we shall need to consider not just one
but a number of symbolic k−paths. This number depends on the formula
ϕ under investigation, and it is returned as the value fk(ϕ) of the function
fk. We refer to [14] for more details. To construct [M,ϕ]k, we ﬁrst deﬁne
a propositional formula [Mϕ,ι]k that deﬁnes the fk(ϕ) symbolic k-paths to
be valid k-computations of Mk. For j ∈ {1, . . . , fk(ϕ)}, the j-th symbolic
k−computation is denoted as w0,j, . . . , wk,j, where wi,j for i ∈ {0, . . . , k} are
global state variables.
Let SV be a set of state variables, SF be a set of propositional formulas
over SV , and let lit : {0, 1} × SV → SF be a function deﬁned as follows:
lit(0, p) = ¬p and lit(1, p) = p. Moreover, let greeni : SV
m → SVgi, for
i = 1, . . . , n, e be a function which returns the sequence of state variables
encoding the green states of the i-th agent or environment, and let Idxi and
Idxe be sets of the indexes of the bits of the local states of each agent i
and environment in the global states. Furthermore, let w, v be global state
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variables. We deﬁne the following propositional formulas:
• Is(w) :=
∧m
i=1 lit(s[i], w[i]).
This formula encodes the state s of the model, i.e., s[i] = 1 is encoded by
w[i], and s[i] = 0 is encoded by ¬w[i].
• p(w) is a formula over w[1], . . . , w[m], which is true for a valuation (s1, . . . , sm)
∈ {0, 1}m of (w[1], . . . , w[m]) iﬀ p ∈ V((s1, . . . , sm)), where p ∈ PV .
This formula encodes a proposition p ∈ PV.
• H(w, v) :=
∧m
i=1 w[i]⇔ v[i].
This formula represents logical equivalence between global state encod-
ings, representing the fact that they represent the same state.
• HOi (w) :=
∨
l∈Gi
(
∧gi
j=1 lit(l[j], greeni(w)[j])).
This formula encodes an accessibility of a global state in which agent i is
running correctly.
• HKl (w, v) :=
∧
i∈Idxl
w[i] ⇔ v[i].
This formula represents logical equivalence between l-local state encod-
ings, representing the fact that they represent the same local state, i.e., the
local state in the two states is the same.
• TR(w, v) is a formula over the propositions w[1], . . . , w[m], v[1], . . . , v[m]
that is true for a valuation (s1, . . . , sm) of (w[1], . . . , w[m]) and a valuation
(s′1, . . . , s
′
m) of (v[1], . . . , v[m]) iﬀ ((s1, . . . , sm), (s
′
1, . . . , s
′
m)) ∈ T .
• Lk,j(l) := TR(wk,j, wl,j).
This formula encodes a backward loop connecting the k-th state to the
l-th state in the symbolic k−computation j, for 0 ≤ l ≤ k.
The propositional formula [Mϕ,ι]k, representing the transitions in the k-model,
is given by the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 5.4 [Unfolding of Transition Relation]
Let M = (DS, ι, T, RO1 , . . . , R
O
n , R
K
1 , . . . , R
K
n ,V) be a model, k ∈ N+ be a
bound, and ϕ be an ECTLKD formula. The propositional formula [Mϕ,ι]k is
deﬁned as follows:
[Mϕ,ι]k := Iι(w0,0) ∧
fk(ϕ)∧
j=1
k−1∧
i=0
TR(wi,j, wi+1,j)
where w0,0, and wi,j for 0 ≤ i ≤ k, and 1 ≤ j ≤ fk(ϕ) are global state
variables. [Mϕ,ι]k encodes the initial state ι by w0,0 and constrains the fk(ϕ)
symbolic k-paths to be valid k-computations in Mk.
The next step of the algorithm consists in translating an ECTLKD formula
ϕ into a propositional formula.
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Deﬁnition 5.5 [Translation of ECTLKD formulas] Let a model Mk with ini-
tial state ι, and an ECTLKD formula ϕ be given. We inductively deﬁne the
translation of ϕ at state wm,n into the propositional formula [ϕ]
[m,n]
k as follows:
[p]
[m,n]
k := p(wm,n),
[¬p]
[m,n]
k := ¬p(wm,n),
[α ∧ β]
[m,n]
k := [α]
[m,n]
k ∧ [β]
[m,n]
k ,
[α ∨ β]
[m,n]
k := [α]
[m,n]
k ∨ [β]
[m,n]
k ,
[EXα]
[m,n]
k :=
∨fk(ϕ)
i=1
(
H(wm,n, w0,i) ∧ [α]
[1,i]
k
)
,
[EGα]
[m,n]
k :=
∨fk(ϕ)
i=1
(
H(wm,n, w0,i) ∧ (
∨k
l=0 Lk,i(l)) ∧
∧k
j=0[α]
[j,i]
k
)
,
[EU(α, β)]
[m,n]
k :=
∨fk(ϕ)
i=1
(
H(wm,n, w0,i) ∧
∨k
j=0 ([β]
[j,i]
k ∧
∧j−1
t=0 [α]
[t,i]
k )
)
,
[Olα]
[m,n]
k :=
∨fk(ϕ)
i=1
(
Iι(w0,i) ∧
∨k
j=0 ([α]
[j,i]
k ∧ H
O
l (wj,i))
)
,
[Klα]
[m,n]
k :=
∨fk(ϕ)
i=1
(
Iι(w0,i) ∧
∨k
j=0 ([α]
[j,i]
k ∧ H
K
l (wm,n, wj,i))
)
.
The meaning of the translations above can be intuitively reconstructed
from the deﬁnition of propositional formulas presented earlier. For example,
the formula [EXα]
[m,n]
k expresses the condition that there exists a sub-path
starting from wm,n in which the ﬁrst point w0,i in this computation satisﬁes
α. For [Olα]
[m,n]
k we insist on the existence of a point wj,i in which agent l is
in a green local state, and that it is accessible from the initial state by some
computation. For [Klα]
[m,n]
k we insist on the existence of a point wj,i in which
agent l is in the same local state, and that it is accessible from the initial state
by some computation.
Given the translations above, we can now check ϕ over Mk by checking the
satisﬁability of the propositional formula [Mϕ,ι]k∧[ϕ]Mk , where [ϕ]Mk = [ϕ]
[0,0]
k .
The translation presented above is shown to be correct and complete in the
next section.
6 Correctness of the translation
In this section we prove the correctness of the translation of the model checking
problem into the SAT-problem as given by Deﬁnition 5.4.
Lemma 6.1 Mk, s |= ϕ iﬀ there is a submodel M
′
k of Mk with |Pk
′| ≤ fk(ϕ)
such that M ′k, s |= ϕ.
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Proof. (=>) By structural induction on ϕ. The lemma follows directly for
the propositional variables and their negations.
Assume that the hypothesis holds for all the proper sub-formulas of ϕ.
• ϕ = α ∨ β | α ∧ β. Straightforward.
• ϕ = EXα | EGα | EU(α, β). By induction hypothesis — see [14] page
143.
• Let ϕ = Oiα. If Mk, s |= Oiα, then by deﬁnition: (∃π ∈ Pk)(π(0) = ι and
∃0≤j≤k(sR
O
i π(j)) and π(j) |= α)). By the inductive assumption there is
a submodel M ′k = (DS
′, ι, Pk
′, R′O1 , . . . , R
′O
n , R
′K
1 , . . . , R
′K
n ,V
′) of Mk such
that |Pk
′| ≤ fk(α) and M
′
k, π(j) |= α.
Consider a submodel M ′′k = (DS
′′, Pk
′′, R′′O1 , . . . , R
′′O
n , R
′′K
1 , . . . , R
′′K
n , ι,V
′′)
of Mk, where Pk
′′ = Pk
′ ∪{π} and DS ′′ = States(Pk
′′)∪ {s}. Since π be-
longs to Pk
′′, by the construction of M ′′k and the deﬁnition of the bounded
semantics, we have that M ′′k , s |= Oiα and |Pk
′′| ≤ fk(ϕ) = fk(α) + 1.
• Let ϕ = Kiα. If Mk, s |= Kiα, then by deﬁnition:
(∃π ∈ Pk)(π(0) = ι and ∃0≤j≤k(sR
K
i π(j)) and π(j) |= α)). By induction
there is a submodel M ′k = (DS
′, ι, Pk
′, R′O1 , . . . , R
′O
n , R
′K
1 , . . . , R
′K
n ,V
′) of
Mk such that |Pk
′| ≤ fk(α) and M
′
k, π(j) |= α.
Consider a submodel M ′′k = (DS
′′, ι, Pk
′′, R′′O1 , . . . , R
′′O
n , R
′′K
1 , . . . , R
′′K
n ,V
′′)
of Mk, where Pk
′′ = Pk
′ ∪{π} and DS ′′ = States(Pk
′′)∪ {s}. Since π be-
longs to Pk
′′, by the construction of M ′′k and the deﬁnition of the bounded
semantics, we have that M ′′k , s |= Kiα and |Pk
′′| ≤ fk(ϕ) = fk(α) + 1.
(<=) The proof is straightforward. 
From Lemma 6.1 we can now derive the following.
Corollary 6.2 M |=k ϕ iﬀ there is a submodel M
′
k of Mk with |Pk
′| ≤ fk(ϕ)
such that M ′k, ι |= ϕ.
Proof. It follows from Deﬁnition 4.4, and Lemma 6.1, by using s = ι. 
Lemma 6.3 For each state s of M , the following condition holds: [Mϕ,s]k ∧
[ϕ]Mk is satisﬁable iﬀ there is a submodel M
′
k of Mk with |Pk
′| ≤ fk(ϕ) such
that M ′k, s |= ϕ.
Proof. (=>) Let [Mϕ,s]k∧ [ϕ]Mk be satisﬁable. By the deﬁnition of the trans-
lation, the propositional formula [ϕ]Mk encodes all the sets of k−computations
of size fk(ϕ) which satisfy the formula ϕ. By the deﬁnition of the unfolding
of the transition relation, the propositional formula [Mϕ,s]k encodes fk(ϕ)
symbolic k-paths to be valid k−computations of Mk. Hence, there is a set
of k−computations in Mk, which satisﬁes the formula ϕ, of size smaller or
equal to fk(ϕ). Thus, we conclude that there is a submodel M
′
k of Mk with
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|Pk
′| ≤ fk(ϕ) and M
′
k, s |= ϕ. The actual deﬁnition of M
′
k can be reconstructed
from Deﬁnition 5.5 and Deﬁnition 5.4.
(<=) The proof is by induction on the length of ϕ. The lemma follows
directly for the propositional variables and their negations. Consider the fol-
lowing cases:
• For ϕ = α ∨ β, α ∧ β or the temporal operators the proof is like in [14].
• Let ϕ = Olα. If M
′
k, s |= Olα with |Pk
′| ≤ fk(Olα), then by Deﬁni-
tion 4.3 we have that there is a k−computation π such that π(0) = ι and
(∃j ≤ k) sROl π(j) and M
′
k, π(j) |= α. Hence, by induction we obtain that
for some j ≤ k the propositional formula [α]
[0,0]
k ∧ [M
α,π(j)]k is satisﬁable.
Let ii = fk(α)+ 1 be the index of a new symbolic k−path which satisﬁes
the formula Iι(w0,ii). Therefore, by the construction above, it follows that
the propositional formula Iι(w0,ii) ∧
∨k
j=0 ([α]
[j,ii]
k ∧H
O
l (wj,ii)) ∧ [M
Olα,s]k
is satisﬁable. Therefore, the following propositional formula is satisﬁable:∨
1≤i≤fk(Olα)
(
Iι(w0,i) ∧
∨k
j=0 ([α]
[j,i]
k ∧H
O
l (wj,i)) ∧ [M
Olα,s]k
)
.
Hence, by the deﬁnition of the translation of an ECTLKD formula, the
above formula is equal to the propositional formula [Olα]
[0,0]
k ∧ [M
Olα,s]k.
• Let ϕ = Klα. If M
′
k, s |= Klα with |Pk
′| ≤ fk(Klα), then by Deﬁni-
tion 4.3 we have that there is a k−computation π such that π(0) = ι and
(∃j ≤ k) sRKl π(j) and M
′
k, π(j) |= α. Hence, by induction we obtain that
for some j ≤ k the propositional formula [α]
[0,0]
k ∧ [M
α,π(j)]k is satisﬁable.
Let ii = fk(α) + 1 be the index of a new symbolic k−path which satis-
ﬁes the formula Iι(w0,ii). Therefore, by the construction above, it follows
that the propositional formula Iι(w0,ii) ∧
∨k
j=0 ([α]
[j,ii]
k ∧H
K
l (w0,0, wj,ii)) ∧
[MKlα,s]k is satisﬁable. Therefore, the following propositional formula is
satisﬁable:∨
1≤i≤fk(Klα)
(
Iι(w0,i) ∧
∨k
j=0 ([α]
[j,i]
k ∧H
K
l (w0,0, wj,i)) ∧ [M
Klα,s]k
)
.
Hence, by the deﬁnition of the translation of an ECTLKD formula, the
above formula is equal to the propositional formula [Klα]
[0,0]
k ∧ [M
Klα,s]k.

Theorem 6.4 Let M be a model, Mk be a k−model of M , and ϕ be an
ECTLKD formula. Then, M |=k ϕ iﬀ [ϕ]Mk ∧ [M
ϕ,ι]k is satisﬁable.
Proof. Follows from Lemmas 6.1 and 6.3. 
Corollary 6.5 M |=k ¬ϕ iﬀ [ϕ]Mk ∧ [M
ϕ,ι]k is unsatisﬁable for k = |M |.
This concludes our analysis of the translation technique. We now give an
example to demonstrate how it can be put into practice.
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7 Model checking the bit transmission problem with
faults
The bit-transmission problem [8] involves two agents, a sender S, and a re-
ceiver R, communicating over a possibly faulty communication channel. S
wants to communicate some information—the value of a bit for the sake of
the example—to R. One protocol to achieve this is as follows [8]. S imme-
diately starts sending the bit to R, and continues to do so until it receives
an acknowledgement from R. R does nothing until it receives the bit; from
then on it sends acknowledgements of receipt to S. S stops sending the bit to
R when it receives an acknowledgement. Note that R will continue sending
acknowledgements even after S has received its acknowledgement. Intuitively,
S will know for sure that R received the bit when it gets an acknowledgement
from R. R, on the other hand, will never be able to know whether its acknowl-
edgement has been received since S does not answer the acknowledgement.
We refer to [9] for further discussion.
In this section we are interested in applying the machinery of bounded
model checking to verify a version of the scenario above where one agent
does not operate as it is supposed to. This version of the scenario was ﬁrst
described in [10]. In particular we examine in detail only the possibility that
R is faulty 9 . Speciﬁcally, we shall consider in this section the possibility that
R may send acknowledgements without having received the bit. This is a
simple example of an agent not following its speciﬁcation. This scenario can
be analysed by means of deontic interpreted systems. We report here brieﬂy
part of the analysis that was conducted in [10], and then proceed to model
check the example.
There are three active components in the scenario: a sender, a receiver, and
a communication channel. In line with the spirit of the formalism of (deontic)
interpreted systems, it is convenient to see sender and receiver as agents, and
the communication channel as the environment. Each of these can be modelled
by considering their local states 10 . For the sender S, it is enough to consider
four possible local states and since we are not admitting the possibility of
faults, its local states are all green. They represent the value of the bit that
S is attempting to transmit, and whether or not S has received an acknowl-
edgement from R. We thus have: LS = GS = {0, 1, 0-ack, 1-ack}, RS = ∅.
For the environment it is enough to consider a singleton: LE = {·}. More-
9 The possibility that S is faulty, and other combinations of faulty R, S and E, can be
treated in similar fashion.
10 Recall that, in order to apply the machinery of deontic interpreted systems we have
to split the set of local states of agent i into two disjoint sets: green (Gi) and red (Ri),
representing correct and incorrect functioning behaviour respectively.
B. Woz´na et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 126 (2005) 93–114 109
over, we assume that all local states of the environment are green, so we have:
LE = GE, RE = ∅. It remains to model the local states of the receiver R.
Six diﬀerent local states are enough to capture the state of R: the value
of the received bit, the circumstance in which no bit has been received yet
(represented by ), the circumstance in which R has sent an acknowledge-
ment without having received the value of the bit (denoted by -ack), and
the circumstance in which R has sent an acknowledgement having received
the value of the bit (represented by 0-ack and 1-ack). It remains to deter-
mine which local states of R should be classiﬁed as red, and which as a green.
This depends on how we interpret the ack component. We can view the ack
as a proof that one faulty acknowledgement was sent before the value of the
bit was received. On this reading we obtain the following partition of the
set LR = {0, 1, , 0-ack, 1-ack, -ack} of R’s local states: GR = {0, 1, }, and
RR = {-ack,0-ack,1-ack}.
The set of actions available to the agents are as follows: ActS
ActR = {sendack , λ}, where λ stands for no action (‘no-op’). The actions ActE
for the environment correspond to the transmission of messages between S
and R on the unreliable communication channel. We will assume that the
communication channel can transmit messages in both directions simultane-
ously, and that a message travelling in one direction can get through while
a message travelling in the opposite direction is lost. The set of actions for
the environment is ActE = {↔, →, ←, −}, where ↔ represents the action in
which the channel transmits any message successfully in both directions, →
that it transmits successfully from S to R but loses any message from R to
S, ← that it transmits successfully from R to S but loses any message from
S to R, and − that it loses any messages sent in either direction.
The protocols the agents are running are as follows:
• PS(0) = PS(1) = {sendbit}, PS(0-ack) = PS(1-ack) = {λ},
• PR(0) = PR(1) = {sendack}, PR() = {λ},
PR(0-ack) = PR(1-ack) = {sendack}, PR(-ack) = {λ, sendack}.
• PE(·) = ActE = {↔, →, ←, −}.
Note that if R performs a faulty action there is no possibility of recovery.
It should be straightforward to infer the transition system that is induced by
the informal description of the scenario we considered above together with the
local states and protocols deﬁned above. We refer to [10] for further discussion.
We now encode the local states in binary form in order to use them in the
model checking technique. Since the sender S can be in 4 diﬀerent local green
states we shall need 2 bits to encode its state; we take: (0, 0) = 0, (0, 1) = 1,
(1, 0) = 0-ack, (1, 1) = 1-ack. Since the receiver R can be in 3 diﬀerent
={sendbit , λ},
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local green states and in 3 diﬀerent local red states, we shall need 2 + 2 bits
to encode its state; we take: (1, 0; 0, 0) = 0, (0, 1; 0, 0) = 1, (0, 0; 0, 0) = ,
(0, 0; 1, 0) = 0-ack, (1, 1; 0, 0) = 1-ack, (1, 1; 1, 0) = -ack. The modelling of
the environment E requires only one bit: (0) = ·
In view of this, a global state is modelled by a byte: s = (s[1], s[2], s[3],
s[4], s[5], s[6], s[7]). For instance the initial state ι = (0, , ·) is represented
as a tuple of seven 0’s. If we want to represent it in terms of propositional
variables, we shall have to insist on the propositions encoding the state to
be in the state of false. In other words, we would encode the initial state as
follows: Iι(w0,0) =
∧7
i=1 ¬w0,0[i].
Let PV = {bit = 0,bit = 1, recbit, recack}. We use the following inter-
pretation for the proposition variables in PV :
(M, s) |= bit = 0 if lS(s) = 0 or lS(s) = 0-ack,
(M, s) |= bit = 1 if lS(s) = 1 or lS(s) = 1-ack,
(M, s) |= recbit if lR(s) = 1 or lR(s) = 0 or lR(s) = 0-ack or lR(s) = 1-ack,
(M, s) |= recack if lS(s) = 1-ack or lS(s) = 0-ack.
Some properties we may be interested in checking for the example above
are the following:
(i) AG
(
¬recack ∨KS(OR(KR(bit = 0) ∨KR(bit = 1)))
)
(ii) OR(recack ∧ ¬(KR(bit = 0) ∨KR(bit = 1)))
(iii) AG
(
OR(KS(KR(bit = 0) ∨KR(bit = 1)))
)
(iv) AU
(
OR(KR(bit = 0) ∨KR(bit = 1)), recack
)
Property (i) says that forever in the future if an ack is received by S,
then S knows that in all the states where R is functioning correctly, R knows
the value of the bit. Property (ii) states that in all the states where R is
functioning correctly S has received an acknowledgement and R does not
know the value of the bit. Property (iii) says that forever in the future in
all the states where R is functioning correctly, S knows that R knows the
value of the bit. Property (iv) says that at one point at the future an ack is
received by S and at all the preceding points in time in all states where R
was operating as intended R knew the value of the bit.
The property (i) is true on the interpreted system in consideration, but
the properties (ii), (iii) and (iv) are not. The formula (i) is an ACTLKD
formula, so in order to check it we shall have to encode the whole model. We
can do this in the BMC technique reported above, but, as mentioned already,
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the beneﬁts of BMC are most apparent when only a fraction of the model is
generated. For example this happens in formulas (ii), (iii) and (iv) where we
need to check validity of an ECTLKD formula in the model. For the purposes
of this paper we check validity of the formula (iii). The negated formula is:
ϕ := EF
(
OR(KS(KR¬(bit = 0) ∧KR¬(bit = 1)))
)
The translation for the propositions used in ϕ is as follows: (bit = 0)(w)
:= (¬w[1] ∧ ¬w[2]) ∨ (w[1] ∧ ¬w[2]), which means that (bit = 0) holds at all
the global states with the ﬁrst local state equal to (0, 0) or (1, 0). (bit = 1)(w)
:= (¬w[1] ∧ w[2]) ∨ (w[1] ∧ w[2]), which means that (bit = 1) holds at all the
global states with the ﬁrst local state equal to (0, 1) or (1, 1).
The translation for the equality of the R-local states is as follows:
HK
R
(w, v) =
∧6
i=3 w[i]⇔ v[i], and the translation of an accessibility of a global
state in which R is running correctly is as follows: HO
R
(v) = (v[3] ∧ ¬v[4]) ∨
(¬v[3]∧ v[4])∨ (¬v[3]∧¬v[4])∨ (¬v[3]∧¬v[4])∨ (v[3]∧ v[4]). The translation
of the equality of the S-local states is as follows: HK
S
(w, v) =
∧2
i=1 w[i] ⇔ v[i].
We calculate that fk(ϕ) = 5 for all k ∈ N+ (see Deﬁnition 5.2), so we need
to exploit ﬁve symbolic k−paths. To proceed with the translation, the ﬁrst
thing we need to translate is the initial state ι = (0, , ·), where ι is binary
represented by (0, . . . , 0). With the representation above this will be encoded
by the propositional formula Iι(w0,j) :=
∧7
i=1 ¬w0,j[i], for 0 ≤ j ≤ 5.
The next step is to translate the transitions T (wi,j, wi+1,j); for simplic-
ity we report only on one transition for the case k = 1, and in particular
only on the formula T (w0,1, w1,1) representing the ﬁrst transition of the ﬁrst
path. The remaining formulas are T (w0,2, w1,2), T (w0,3, w1,3), T (w0,4, w1,4) and
T (w0,5, w1,5).
To encode the whole example we should model all the transitions for all
the k’s starting from k := 1. We do not do it here. Let us now encode the
formula ϕ we would like to check.
[ϕ][0,0]1 :=∨5
i=1
(
H(wm,n, w0,i) ∧
∨k
j=0[OR(KS(KR¬(bit = 0) ∧KR¬(bit = 1)))]
[j,i]
k
)
Next:
[OR(KS(KR¬(bit = 0) ∧KR¬(bit = 1)))]
[j,i]
k :=
∨5
i=1
(
Iι(w0,i) ∧
∨k
j=0 (H
O
R
(wj,i) ∧ [KS(KR¬(bit = 0) ∧KR¬(bit = 1))]
[j,i]
k )
)
Next:
[KS(KR¬(bit = 0) ∧KR¬(bit = 1))]
[j,i]
k :=
∨5
i=1
(
Iι(w0,i) ∧
∨k
j=0 ([(KR¬(bit = 0) ∧KR¬(bit = 1))]
[j,i]
k ∧ H
K
S
(wm,n, wj,i))
)
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Next:
[(KR¬(bit = 0)∧KR¬(bit = 1))]
[j,i]
k = [KR¬(bit = 0)]
[j,i]
k ∧[KR¬(bit = 1)]
[j,i]
k
Next:
[KR¬(bit = 0)]
[j,i]
k :=
∨5
i=1
(
Iι(w0,i) ∧
∨k
j=0 ([¬(bit = 0)]
[j,i]
k ∧ H
K
R
(wm,n, wj,i))
)
[KR¬(bit = 1)]
[j,i]
k :=
∨5
i=1
(
Iι(w0,i) ∧
∨k
j=0 ([¬(bit = 1)]
[j,i]
k ∧ H
K
R
(wm,n, wj,i))
)
Next:
[¬(bit = 0)]
[j,i]
k := ¬(bit = 0)(wj,i) and [¬(bit = 1)]
[j,i]
k := ¬(bit = 1)(wj,i).
Checking that the bit transmission protocol satisﬁes the temporal deontic
formula above can now be done by feeding a SAT solver with the propositional
formula generated in this method. This would produce a solution, thereby
proving that the propositional formula is satisﬁable.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we extended the methodology of bounded model checking for
CTLK, presented in [13] by adding the deontic notion of correct functioning
behaviours of the agents. This notion was explored in [11,10].
Model checking of deontic interpreted system may also be performed by
means of Ordered Binary Diagrams (OBDD). This was explored in [15,16].
Future work include an implementation of the algorithm presented here,
a careful evaluation of experimental results to be obtained, and a comparison
of the OBDD and SAT based model checking method for deontic interpreted
systems.
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